Following the DPPA’s enactment, South Carolina and its Attorney General, respondent Condon, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore. Citation. 977–979, 986–992 (1997). Finding that many States sell this information to individuals and businesses (particularly direct marketing and auto insurance companies) for significant revenues, and to prevent stalkers from tracking their victims across state lines, Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. The DPPA defines "personal information" as any information "that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information," but not including "information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status." §§ 2721–2725, which established a regulatory scheme to restrict the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (CA7 1998) (noting that the Wisconsin Department of Transportation receives approximately $8 million each year from the sale of motor vehicle information). In. Supp., at 992. It is governed by SC v. Baker because the DPPA does not require the legislature to enact any laws (NY) and does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals (Printz). While the DPPA defines “person” to exclude States and state agencies, §2725(2), a state agency that maintains a “policy or practice of substantial noncompliance” with the Act maybe subject to a civil penalty imposed by the United States Attorney General of not more than $5,000 per day of substantial noncompliance. United States, 521 U.S. 898. The United States asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, U. S. With him on the briefs were Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein. Concluding that the DPPA is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution's division of power between the States and the Federal Government, the District Court granted summary judgment for the State and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State and its officers. Charles Condon: The DPPA regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information—the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce. We further noted: As a final matter, we turn to South Carolina's argument that the DPPA is unconstitutional because it regulates the States exclusively. New York, NY 10004 (212) 925-6635 Park, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas H. Odom, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, W. A. State law authorizes the South Carolina DMV to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle information, and it requires the DMV to allow drivers to prohibit the use of their motor vehicle information for certain commercial activities. The information is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate motoring. 29466, 29468, 29469 (1993); 140 Cong. Rec. For example, the DPPA requires disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, the Clean Air Act, and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49." We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz.. Rather, South Carolina asks that the DPPA be invalidated in its entirety, even as it is applied to the States acting purely as commercial sellers. Any person who knowingly violates the DPPA may be subject to a criminal fine, §§ 2723(a), 2725(2). Ibid. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. §§56–3–510 to 56–3–540 (Supp. Ibid. For example, the DPPA. The Federal Government correctly asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, U. S. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly. III). We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1111 (1999), and now reverse. §§2722(a) and (b). The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” Id., at 935. Because drivers' personal, identifying information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to. 18 U.S.C. See, South Carolina contends that the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment because it "thrusts upon the States all of the, But the fact that drivers' personal information is, in the context of this case, an article in interstate commerce does not conclusively resolve the constitutionality of the DPPA. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Act violates constitutional principles of federalism. South Carolina emphasizes that the DPPA requires the State's employees to learn and apply the Act's substantive restrictions, which are summarized above, and notes that these activities will consume the employees' time and thus the State's resources. The United States bases its Commerce Clause argument on the fact that the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a "thin[g] in interstate commerce," and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation. See Pub. Instead of determining whether such "general applicability" is indeed a Constitutional requirement, Rehnquist merely pointed out that the DPPA was "generally applicable", because in addition to regulating the actions of state governments, it also regulated private persons who resold or redistributed drivers' information. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits had held that the DPPA was constitutional because it was a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause powers and did not violate the Tenth Amendment. See, We of course begin with the time-honored presumption that the DPPA is a "constitutional exercise of legislative power. 3. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. The DPPA establishes several penalties to be imposed on States and private actors that fail to comply with its requirements. § 56-3-520. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court. If a State has obtained drivers’ consent to disclose their personal information to private persons generally and a private person has obtained that information, the private person may redisclose the information for any purpose. by Gregg P. Leslie. Because drivers' information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation. §§ 2721(b)(11), (13), and (d). Const., Art. ", In the lower courts, the United States also asserted that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States’ petition for certiorari and briefs to this Court do not address the §5 issue and, at oral argument, the Solicitor General expressly disavowed any reliance on it. When we granted certiorari in this case, the DPPA provided that a DMV could obtain that consent either on a case-by-case basis or could imply consent if the State provided drivers with an opportunity to block disclosure of their personal information when they received or renewed their licenses and drivers did not avail themselves of that opportunity. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. We agree with the United States' contention. I, §8, cl. Senator Boxer, the sponsor of the bill, expressly linked the need to prevent stalking and violence to Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. Additionally, any person who knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses information from a state motor vehicle record for a use other than those specifically permitted by the DPPA may be subject to liability in a civil action brought by the driver to whom the information pertains. 986 §§ 350(c), (d), and (e), App. S.C. Code Ann. Congress can, however, regulate the activities of the states themselves. by Richard Ruda and Charles A. Rothfeld; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ann M. Hayes and Deborah J. LaFetra; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson; and for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. RENO v. CONDON . § 2721(c) (1994 ed. We agree with South Carolina’s assertion that the DPPA’s provisions will require time and effort on the part of state employees, but reject the State’s argument that the DPPA violates the principles laid down in either New York or Printz. III) (citations omitted). State DMVs require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, vehicle description, Social Security number, medical information, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. No. §56–3–520. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. Before confirming, please ensure that you have thoroughly read and verified the judgment. The United States asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, U.S. The DPPA’s prohibition of nonconsensual disclosures is also subject to a number of statutory exceptions. 977, 979 (1997). 986, which was signed into law on October 9, 1999, changed this “opt-out” alternative to an “opt-in” requirement. ... is the absence of impact on private parties, and the statute just impacts on the States, and I give you an example and you say, well, that's all right because it's not very serious, or does the principle apply there? The DPPA permits DMVs to disclose personal information from motor vehicle records for a number of purposes.1. 6–10. 540 U.S. 141 (2000) ... Tenth Amendment says that the federal government cannot force the states to enact policies or regulations that would impact the state’s citizens. But we need not address the question whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the DPPA is generally applicable.